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A DUBIOUS EXERCISE OF CASE 
CONSOLIDATION: CENTER FOR 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY v.  
BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. 
REBECCA M. MITCHELL* 
Abstract: The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the dispersal of mil-
lions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 generated a mass of lit-
igation. To organize and manage this complex mass, the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana created “pleading bundles,” which con-
solidated similar cases, and provided that each bundle must file a single com-
plaint on behalf of the entire group. In Center for Biological Diversity v. BP 
America Production Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal of most of the Center for Biological Di-
versity’s claims on the grounds of mootness, and further concluded that the 
district court was within its discretion when placing the Center’s case into a 
pleading bundle that did not recognize all of the Center’s claims. This Com-
ment argues that the district court’s consolidation technique prejudiced the 
Center and was inappropriate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans consume approximately 18.7 million barrels of petroleum 
products per day to power the national economy.1 As part of British Petro-
leum’s (BP) efforts to drill in the Gulf of Mexico and meet this demand, BP 
leased the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon from Trans-
ocean, Ltd., and drilled the Macondo well.2 On April 20, 2010, as three 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, at viii (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.
pdf and http://perma.cc/EW69-C5F5. 
 2 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Our US Operations, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/bp-worldwide/bp-in-
america/our-us-operations.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/Q3VJ-
3XAE (explaining that BP supports the American economy by striving and innovating to meet 
increasing energy needs); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE 
APRIL 20, 2010 MACONDO BLOWOUT 1, 13−16 (2011), available at http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_
documents/DWH_IR/reports/dwhfinal.pdf and http://perma.cc/GFP7-NLKP (explaining that deep-
water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico yields high volumes of gas and oil, and that BP plays a large role 
in such operations in the Gulf). 
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friends were out on the thirty-one foot Ramblin’ Wreck for a day of tuna 
fishing, their radio sounded: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, this is the Deep-
water Horizon. We are on fire.”3 The Deepwater Horizon explosion that day 
killed eleven men and began the discharge of about 4.9 million barrels of oil 
into the Gulf of Mexico, which made the accident “the biggest unintentional 
offshore oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry.”4 
More than 100,000 individuals claimants filed lawsuits arising from 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster.5 One such party, the Center for Biological 
Diversity (“the Center”), a nonprofit environmental organization,6 sued BP 
and Transocean under the citizen-suit provisions of three environmental 
statutes.7 To manage this case, along with the hundreds of others, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana exercised a case consoli-
dation technique by grouping similar cases together into “pleading bundles” 
and providing that each pleading bundle file one master complaint.8 
This Comment argues that the Center’s claims were dismissed as a re-
sult of the district court’s improper exercise of case consolidation and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s subsequent deference to this 
pretrial management decision. 9 After the district court’s consolidation of 
claims into pleading bundles and its assignment of the Center’s case to a 
bundle that did not recognize the Center’s requests for civil penalties, the 
court rendered virtually all of the Center’s claims for relief moot.10 On re-
view, the Fifth Circuit in Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America 
Production Co. should have recognized that the district court’s consolida-
tion violated Supreme Court precedent.11 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In President Barack Obama’s address to the nation shortly after the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion, the president declared that the fight against 
                                                                                                                           
 3 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
supra note 1, at 10. 
 4 BP Leak the World’s Worst Accidental Oil Spill, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7924009/BP-leak-the-worlds-worst-accidental-oil-
spill.html, available at http://perma.cc/LW3J-QY4N. 
 5 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 419. 
 6 Id. (discussing the Center for Biological Diversity, a non-profit environmental organization 
with more than 40,000 members, 3500 of which reside along the Gulf). 
 7 Id. at 417–18. 
 8 Id. at 419; see Pretrial Order No. 11 at 2, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d 413 (2:10-md-
02179-CJB-SS), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTO11.pdf and http://
perma.cc/YU4Q-XVEJ (filed Oct. 19, 2010). 
 9 See infra notes 82–100 and accompanying text. 
 10 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 419–32. 
 11 See infra notes 67–74, 96–100, 117–119 and accompanying text. 
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the millions of gallons of spilled oil would continue.12 In June and August 
2010,13 just months after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the Center sued 
BP and Transocean under the citizen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), 14  Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA), 15  and Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).16 The Center sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, as well as civil penalties, in its individual complaint.17 
The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the Cen-
ter’s complaints, along with hundreds of other cases, to a district court judge 
in the Eastern District of Louisiana.18 To manage the complex litigation, the 
judge issued Pretrial Order No. 11, which consolidated the various claims into 
pleading bundles organized based on similarity.19 Accordingly, the judge pro-
vided that each pleading bundle would file a master complaint.20 The Center’s 
complaints were placed into Pleading Bundle D1, which was for injunctive or 
regulatory claims against private parties.21 The D1 Master Complaint was 
markedly similar to the Center’s original complaint, but the Master Com-
plaint did not request civil penalties.22 Instead, the Center’s requests for civil 
penalties were stayed “until further order of the Court.” 23 Although the Cen-
                                                                                                                           
 12 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President to the 
Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-nation-bp-oil-spill, available at http://perma.cc/XWY6-6PVC. 
 13 The Center brought two lawsuits against the defendants because the first suit, filed on June 
18, 2010, alleged only violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 
704 F.3d at 418–19. The second suit, filed in August 2010, asserted additional claims under the 
CWA, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, and Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Id. 
 14 In the Center’s initial suit, it alleged five counts of violations of the CWA for discharge of 
pollutants (toxic and otherwise), discharge of oil and hazardous substances, violations of national 
standards of performance for offshore drilling operations, and gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct. Id. at 419; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1321, 1317, 1316, 1321(b)(7)(D) (2006). 
 15 The Center charged the defendants with “failure to report the release of hazardous sub-
stances to the emergency coordinator for the local emergency planning committee, in violation of 
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11004.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 419. 
 16 The Center also charged the defendants with “failure to report to the National Response 
Center the release of hazardous substances, in violation of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).” Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 “Pretrial Order No. 11 established several ‘pleading bundles’ into each of which claims of 
similar nature would be placed.” Id.; Pretrial Order No. 11, supra note 8, at 2–4. 
 20 Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 419. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 420 (explaining that “the allegations and prayers for relief contained in the Master 
Complaint were deemed to amend and supersede allegations and claims contained in the pre-
existing individual complaints”). 
 23 Id. at 419–20. 
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ter moved on three occasions to have all of its claims moved into a pleading 
bundle that recognized civil penalties, those attempts were unsuccessful.24 
On June 16, 2011, the district court dismissed the D1 Master Com-
plaint in its entirety.25 After the district court’s dismissal, the Center asked 
the court for clarification as to whether its individual complaint requesting 
civil penalties had been dismissed along with the D1 Master Complaint.26 
Several months passed without a response to the Center’s request for clari-
fication.27 Eventually, the Center “asked that the court enter a final judg-
ment in order to allow the Center to exercise its right of appeal.”28 In ac-
cordance with this request, and pursuant to the reasons set forth in the dis-
trict court’s June 2011 Order,29 “as that Order relates to the Center’s indi-
vidual complaints,” the court entered a final judgment.30 The Center then 
appealed the final judgment.31 
On January 9, 2013, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s find-
ings that all claims related to the CWA and CERCLA were moot.32 The 
Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that it was unable to determine whether 
the defendants had satisfied EPCRA’s reporting requirements.33 As a result, 
the Fifth Circuit held that the EPCRA claim was not moot and remanded so 
that the lower court could redress the Center’s claimed informational inju-
ry.34 On appeal, the Center also challenged “the district court’s use of plead-
ing bundles and the separation of the Center’s claims for injunctive relief 
and civil penalties,” and argued “that the district court’s failure to place its 
civil penalties claims into a pleading bundle . . . resulted in a de facto dis-
missal of those claims.”35 The Fifth Circuit held that the district court was 
exercising its discretion in creating pleading bundles and segregating the 
Center’s claims for relief.36 The Fifth Circuit also held that the dismissal of 
these claims was “at the Center’s own insistence by demanding a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal.”37 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 420. 
 25 The district court dismissed the Master Complaint upon finding that (1) the D1 plaintiffs 
lacked standing, (2) the D1 claims were moot, and (3) the D1 claims were not actionable. Id.; In re 
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 792 F. 
Supp. 2d 926, 933 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 26 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 421. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 30 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 421. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id. at 426–29. 
 33 Id. at 430–32. 
 34 Id. at 430, 432. 
 35 Id. at 431–32. 
 36 Id. at 432. 
 37 Id. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation may transfer civil actions involving common questions of fact in dif-
ferent districts to a single district for consolidated pretrial proceedings.38 
Once the panel has completed such a transfer, “[s]ection 1407 contemplates 
that the degree and manner of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceed-
ings is left entirely to the discretion of the [transferee] judge.”39 The legisla-
tive history of § 1407 also indicates that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (FRCP) define the parameters of a transferee court’s pretrial authori-
ty.40 Specifically, FRCP 42(a) states: “If actions before the court involve a 
common question of law or fact,41 the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial 
any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) 
issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”42 Furthermore, 
courts have recognized that a “trial court’s managerial power is especially 
strong and flexible in matters of consolidation.”43 
Given a trial judge’s broad authority, case consolidation is proper when 
an action not only satisfies threshold requirements but also serves the inter-
ests of judicial economy.44 In FRCP 42(a)’s consideration of an order for 
consolidation, the rule “permits the [c]ourt to weigh the savings of time and 
effort that consolidation would produce against any inconvenient delay or 
expense that would be caused to the parties and to the [c]ourt.”45 In 1999, 
Pennsylvania citizens brought a public liability action, Hall v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., against a nuclear fuel fabrication facility and alleged that radia-
tion released from the facility caused their cancer.46 Within this public lia-
bility action, more than two hundred claims were consolidated into eight 
cases for trial.47 Despite the defendants’ objection to the consolidation, the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania concluded that 
                                                                                                                           
 38 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 39 In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 510 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (J.P.M.L. 1979). 
 40 In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 144 (3d Cir. 2000); H.R. REP. NO. 1130 (1968), reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900. 
 41 Whether two proceedings involve a common party and common issues of fact or law has 
been deemed the “threshold issue” for consolidation. Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
134 F.R.D. 20, 21 (D. Mass. 1991). 
 42 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). 
 43 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 432 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 
1977)). 
 44 See Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 716, 733 (W.D. Pa. 1999); supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
 45 United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 911 (D.N.H. 1985). 
 46 69 F. Supp. 2d at 719. 
 47 Id. at 732. 
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the consolidation was appropriate.48 To prevail, the plaintiff must have been 
able to prove a violation of the same statute in each individual case, and the 
court concluded, “[that] determination, in itself, would be sufficient to sup-
port consolidation.”49 The defendants also did not allege any specific preju-
dice that might result from an order of consolidation, which provided fur-
ther support for the determination that consolidation was an appropriate and 
effective tool for case management.50 
In the 1985 case United States v. Mottolo, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire granted only a partial consolidation of two 
causes of action.51 The court reasoned that the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response Compensation and Liability Act claims in the case would be 
most efficiently handled in one consolidated trial to avoid duplicative litiga-
tion and a waste of resources.52 On the other hand, a series of pendent state 
claims presented different questions of law and fact, and the court found 
that “consolidation of these state claims would prove more confusing than 
efficient.”53 
Case consolidation is inappropriate when the costs of consolidation 
outweigh the benefits.54 Where consolidation is a possibility, the benefit of 
judicial economy “must yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impar-
tial trial.”55 In the 1991 case Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts denied the plaintiff’s motion to further 
consolidate National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 cases with a suit 
brought under the Water Pollution Control Act arising from sewage dis-
charges into the Boston Harbor.56 The court found that the costs of consoli-
dation “grossly outweighed” the benefits; the Boston Harbor case was al-
ready “unwieldy”57 such that the addition of more parties and issues would 
muddle a pending proceeding that had already amassed a great volume.58 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 732–33. 
 49 Id. at 733. 
 50 Id. 
 51 605 F. Supp. at 911–12. 
 52 Id. at 911. 
 53 Id. at 912. 
 54 Town of Norfolk, 134 F.R.D. at 21. 
 55 Solvent Chem. Co. ICC v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 242 F. Supp. 2d 196, 221 (W.D.N.Y. 
2002) (citing Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added). 
 56 Town of Norfolk, 134 F.R.D. at 21–22. 
 57 Id. at 22; see Americus Mortg. Corp. v. Mark, No. 12–10158–GAO, 2013 WL 3106018, at 
*12 (D. Mass. June 17, 2013). 
 58 Town of Norfolk, 134 F.R.D. at 22. 
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Case consolidation is also improper if it causes prejudice59 to a party.60 
FRCP 42(a) is “designed to achieve efficiency without compromising a liti-
gant’s right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial.”61 In the 1993 
case Malcolm v. National Gypsum Company, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s consolidation under an 
abuse of discretion standard.62 The Second Circuit reviewed 600 asbestos-
related cases in a “herculean task” wherein the district court employed a set 
of criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of the consolidation.63 Despite the 
view that judicial efficiency favors consolidation, the Second Circuit feared 
that the jury would “[throw] up its hands in the face of a torrent of evi-
dence.”64 Ultimately, the Second Circuit overturned the order of consolida-
tion and concluded, “it is possible to go too far in the interests of expedien-
cy and to sacrifice basic fairness in the process.”65 
In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 
Inc., the Supreme Court elaborated upon prejudice and its implications.66 In 
Laidlaw, the Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether a 
defendant’s post-complaint compliance with its Clean Water Act permit67 
rendered claims for civil penalties moot.68 The Supreme Court resolved the 
inconsistency by reversing the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.69 In accord-
ance with the uniform conclusion of other Courts of Appeal,70 the Supreme 
Court established that a “defendant’s voluntary cessation of allegedly un-
                                                                                                                           
 59 “[C]ourts will reject consolidation requests where a preponderance of fairness or prejudice 
concerns, such as inconvenience, delay, expense, or risk of jury confusion, appears.” V.A.L. 
Floors v. 1418 Tower, L.P., No. 08-CV-5680, 2009 WL 1977840, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2009). 
 60 Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Arnold v. E. Air 
Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 906 (4th Cir. 1988)) (“[C]onsiderations of convenience may not prevail 
where the inevitable consequence to another party is harmful and serious prejudice.”). 
 61 Id. at 354. 
 62 Id. at 348, 350–51, 355 (Walker, J., dissenting); see Santucci v. Pignatello, 188 F.2d 643, 
645 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (“The exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for 
abuse.”). 
 63 Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 348, 350–51. 
 64 Id. at 350–52. 
 65 Id. at 354. 
 66 See 528 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2000). 
 67 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits are issued under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). They “impose limitations on the discharge of 
pollutants, and establish related monitoring and reporting requirements, in order to improve the 
cleanliness and safety of the Nation’s waters.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174. 
 68 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179–80. In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding, which contradicted decisions of the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See 
Atl. States Legal Found. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 1997); Natural Res. 
Def. Council v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 502–03 (3d Cir. 1993); Atl. States Legal 
Found. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1020–21 (2d Cir. 1993); Atl. States Legal 
Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 69 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 173. 
 70 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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lawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case.”71 The Supreme 
Court noted that civil penalties serve as a valuable deterrent with remedial 
potential.72 Additionally, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens equated 
civil penalties with punitive damages, rather than with injunctive or declara-
tory relief, and concluded, “No one contends that a defendant’s post-
complaint conduct could moot a claim for punitive damages; civil penalties 
should be treated the same way.”73 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America Production Co., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana’s dismissal of most74 of the Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity’s (“the Center”) claims relating to the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill.75 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s tak-
ing of judicial notice that the Macondo wellhead was capped in July 2010 
and killed in September 2010, as well as the district court’s findings that all 
but one of the Center’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were 
moot.76 The Fifth Circuit also held that the district court was “well within 
[its] discretion” when it created pleading bundles and separated the Center’s 
claims for civil penalties and injunctive relief.77 The Fifth Circuit reviewed 
the district court’s case management decision and stated that “the court’s 
express and inherent powers enable the judge to exercise extensive supervi-
sion and control of litigation.”78 When the Center’s case was brought before 
the district court judge, the case was one of hundreds, and the Fifth Circuit 
held that considering this “daunting” litigation, the judge’s decision to con-
solidate the Center’s case was within the court’s “broad grant of authori-
ty.”79 When pressed about the dismissal of the civil penalty claims, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the Center, by requesting a final appealable judg-
ment, had abandoned those claims.80 
Case consolidation can be inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s 
discretion when the costs of consolidation outweigh the benefits, 81  and 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 197 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 74 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 75 704 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 76 Id. at 418, 424, 432. 
 77 Id. at 432. 
 78 Id. (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.1 (2004)). 
 79 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 419, 432. 
 80 See id. at 427, 432. “[T]hose [civil penalty] claims were dismissed at the Center’s own insist-
ence by demanding a final judgment for purposes of appeal.” Id. at 432. 
 81 Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 F.R.D. 20, 21 (D. Mass. 1991). 
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“where the inevitable consequence to another party is harmful and serious 
prejudice.”82 In United States v. Mottolo, the court consolidated only certain 
claims and found that consolidation of other pendent state claims would 
cause confusion.83 Similarly, in Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the court found that consolidation of two cases brought un-
der different environmental statutes would increase the unwieldiness of an 
already ponderous set of issues; as a result, the court ultimately denied the 
consolidation request.84 These cases suggest that a potential for confusion 
and unwieldiness are consolidation “costs” that may unduly inconvenience 
an action and render an order for consolidation improper.85 By consolidat-
ing the Center’s claims into a pleading bundle that did not recognize the 
Center’s requests for civil penalties, the district court in Center for Biologi-
cal Diversity unduly inconvenienced the Center with a cost that is arguably 
greater than confusion, namely prejudice.86 
As the court in Malcolm v. National Gypsum Company stated: “The 
systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to trump our dedi-
cation to individual justice and we must take care that each individual plain-
tiff’s . . . cause not be lost in the shadow of a towering mass litigation.”87 
Malcolm discusses the importance of a case maintaining its identity when 
consolidation is under consideration, especially when the case is one of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of cases.88 When Malcolm was decided in 1993, 
asbestos litigation comprised the largest mass toxic tort in the United 
States.89 Regardless of this immense challenge, however, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the very real possibility of prej-
udice and noted that the “benefits of efficiency can never be purchased at 
the cost of fairness.”90 The Second Circuit overturned the district court’s 
order of consolidation.91 In contrast, by separating the Center’s claims for 
injunctive relief from claims for civil penalties, and by failing to include the 
claims for civil penalties in any pleading bundle, the district court in in Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity effectively stripped the Center’s case of its iden-
tity.92 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Arnold v. E. Air 
Lines, Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 906 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
 83 605 F. Supp. 898, 911–12 (D.N.H. 1985). 
 84 134 F.R.D. at 21–22. 
 85 See id.; Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 911–12. 
 86 See 704 F.3d at 420; Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 912; supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 350. 
 88 See id. at 348, 352. 
 89 See id. at 348. 
 90 See id. at 350–52. 
 91 See id. at 354. 
 92 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 704 F.3d at 420; Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 352. 
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In the Center’s case, the district court’s consolidation93 was improper 
because it might have contributed to the eventual dismissal of the Center’s 
case. 94 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., the Supreme Court emphasized the deterrent effect of civil 
penalties and held that a defendant’s compliance after the commencement 
of litigation (as when BP capped the Macondo well on July 15, 2010) will 
not moot claims for civil penalties.95 As a result, Laidlaw required the dis-
trict court in Center for Biological Diversity to recognize the significance96 
of the Center’s civil penalties requests put forth in the Center’s initial Au-
gust 2010 complaint; to do otherwise would prejudice the Center.97 Accord-
ingly, the district court should not have put the Center’s case into a pleading 
bundle that did not recognize these requests.98 At the least, the district court 
judge could have granted any of the Center’s three motions to have all of 
the Center’s claims moved into a pleading bundle that recognized civil pen-
alties.99 
Case consolidation is proper when it serves the interests of judicial 
economy and does not prejudice any party or the court.100 Although the dis-
trict court judge’s creation of pleading bundles was in the interest of judicial 
economy,101 consolidation in Center for Biological Diversity fell short of 
this standard because the Center’s placement into pleading bundle D1 es-
sentially eliminated its civil penalty claims from contention, which preju-
diced the Center.102 The existence of identical claims was significant in the 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 42(a) gave the district court judge the authority to 
consolidate, though he did not explicitly state that he was relying on FRCP 42(a) when issuing 
Pretrial Order 11 and creating pleading bundles. Pretrial Order No. 11, supra note 8, at 2–4; see 
supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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court’s decision in Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. to consolidate the case.103 
Furthermore, in Hall, due to the absence of any allegations of specific prej-
udice, the court was not convinced by the defendants’ arguments in opposi-
tion to an order of consolidation.104 In stark contrast, in the Center’s August 
2010 individual complaint, the Center sought civil penalties, and had it not 
requested a final appealable judgment, it would never have belonged in a 
pleading bundle seeking solely injunctive and regulatory relief.105 In addi-
tion, as a result of the district court’s placement of the Center’s case into 
pleading bundle D1, the Center suffered specific prejudice because the Cen-
ter was inconvenienced106 by its inability to request monetary damages un-
der the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act, Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act, and Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act.107 
Both Hall and Malcolm involve the consolidation of hundreds of cases 
into a more manageable few.108 Taken together, Hall and Malcolm present a 
significant paradigm, however, because they demonstrate the line between 
what is and is not an appropriate exercise of pretrial consolidation, respec-
tively.109 The Hall court recognized that consolidation of massive amounts 
of claims, each of which presented common questions of law or fact, and 
resulted in no specific prejudice to the defendants, was not only an effective 
management tool but was also in the interest of judicial economy.110 On the 
contrary, in Malcolm the “reversal of consolidation was appropriate where 
the . . . ‘prejudice arising from an improper consolidation’ . . . simply could 
not be eliminated.” 111  Similarly, in Center for Biological Diversity, the 
prejudice that befell the Center as a result of improper consolidation of its 
claims cannot be eliminated.112 Complex litigation inevitably requires a trial 
court to employ strategies to manage a “sclerotic backlog of cases.”113 Per 
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Malcolm, however, this efficiency cannot be achieved without consideration 
of the individual cases for which consolidation is in question.114 
In Center for Biological Diversity, either the district court should have 
been more meticulous in its assignment of cases to pleading bundles, re-
gardless of how “daunting” the task, or the Fifth Circuit should not have 
taken such a deferential approach toward the district court.115 Laidlaw made 
the Center’s claims for civil penalties unique: The claims had a potential to 
preclude the district court’s finding of mootness.116 Appellate courts in the 
future should take heed of the warning in Malcolm and review trial judges’ 
decisions to consolidate with greater scrutiny, especially where the risk of a 
single case being “lost in the shadow of a towering mass of litigation” is so 
great.117 
CONCLUSION 
The old adage that with great power comes great responsibility is still 
true today. The Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill generated a mass 
of litigation that essentially mandated that courts employ strategies in pur-
suit of judicial economy. These strategies signify a power that should have 
been met with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana’s 
recognition of the particularities of environmental law citizen suits. Case 
consolidation can be a significant tool in a court’s arsenal, but not at the 
expense of prejudicing a party. The Center for Biological Diversity’s case in 
Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America Production Co. was a 
casualty of the prejudicial exercise of this power, and one can only hope 
that in the future, courts are more mindful of the implications of their pretri-
al case management decisions. 
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